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EVIDENCE – EXPERT TESTIMONY 
SUMMARY 
 Two consolidated petitions for writs of mandamus dealing with the admission of 
evidence regarding the qualification of a nurse to testify as an expert in medical causation and 
whether defense expert testimony offering alternative causation theories must meet the 
Morsicato
2
 Standard.  
DISPOSITION/OUTCOME 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada granted the writs in part and denied in part. It held that a 
nurse may testify as an expert in his or her field of expertise, but not as to medical causation 
unless he or she had obtained the requisite knowledge and experience to identify cause.  
The Court also held that allowance of a defense expert’s alternative theory of causation 
depends on how the defendant utilizes the expert’s testimony. It held that a defense expert’s 
testimony need not be stated to a reasonable degree of medical probability if the testimony is to 
controvert an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. However, if the testimony traverses the 
plaintiff’s causation theory and establishes an independent causation theory, the testimony must 
qualify under the Morsicato standard.  
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Both writ petitions arose from separate actions involving the Endoscopy Clinic of 
Southern Nevada and an outbreak of Hepatitis C in its patients. In each case, plaintiffs sued 
pharmaceutical companies for strict products liability and alleged that defective vials produced 
by the companies caused the patients to contract Hepatitis C. 
 To contradict these allegations, defendants offered the expert testimony of a registered 
nurse specializing in endoscopy procedures and a doctor who is a professor of medicine. 
Plaintiffs in both cases moved to exclude these experts’ testimonies.  
In Docket No. 56928 the plaintiffs argued that neither expert could testify because they 
“did not have an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical probability,” and also argued that 
nurses cannot give testimony regarding causation. The district court denied the motion and 
allowed both experts to testify. 
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In Docket no. 57079 the plaintiffs similarly moved to prohibit the nurse from testifying, 
and the district court granted the motion because it felt the nurse could not testify at a greater 
than the 50 percent probability that is required under Morsicato.  
After the district courts issued their orders, the losing parties petitioned for writs of 
mandamus. Both cases were stayed and the petitions for writs were consolidated.   
DISCUSSION 
When a writ of mandamus is appropriate. 
 In Walton v. District Court
3
, the Supreme Court of Nevada held the admissibility of 
expert testimony if not typically subject to review on a petition for writ of mandamus because the 
chance to appeal a final judgment usually provides an adequate and more appropriate remedy. 
 Despite this general rule, the Court felt that this situation was appropriate for a narrow 
exception. This issue was one of first impression, and a speedy resolution would promote judicial 
economy because the issues brought before the court in these petitions “have the potential of 
being repeated in the many endoscopy cases pending before the district court.” 
 Despite this exception, the Court emphasized that unless there are extraordinary 
circumstances, the Court will not consider writ petitions challenging evidentiary rulings.  
Standard of Review. 
 With writ petitions, the Court reviews questions of law de novo while giving deference to 
the district court’s findings of fact.4 All the issues in these petitions are questions of law; 
therefore the Court reviewed them de novo. 
Admissibility of the nurse’s and doctor’s testimonies.  
 To testify as an expert in Nevada, the district court must first determine the witness’s 
qualification, including whether 
 (1) he or she [is] qualified in an area of “scientific, technical or 
other specialized knowledge” (the qualification requirement); (2) 
his or her specialized knowledge must “assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” (the 
assistance requirement); and (3) his or her testimony must be 
limited “to matters within the scope of [his or her specialized 
knowledge” (the limited scope requirement).5 
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Nurse in this case not qualified to testify as to medical causation. 
 In Hallmark, the Court listed formal schooling and academic degrees, licensure, 
employment experience and practical experience and specialized training as a non-exhaustive list 
of factors when assessing whether an expert witness is appropriately qualified.
6
  
 The Court held that a nurse may be allowed to testify as to causation if, after proper 
examination of the nurse’s knowledge and experience, the court finds the nurse to be qualified as 
an expert in that area.  
 In this case, however, the Court found that the nurse in question could not testify as to 
causation. This nurse had extensive experience in cleaning and disinfecting endoscopy 
equipment, but he did not have experience in diagnosing the cause of Hepatitis C, which was the 
crux of the disputed testimony in this case. The nurse was a leading expert in endoscopic 
reprocessing but that alone does not qualify him to testify as to medical causation. 
The doctor will assist the trier of fact.  
 The Morsicato standard says that “medical expert testimony regarding causation must be 
made to a reasonable degree of medical probability.”7 Here, the Court held that if the defense 
testimony is offered as an alternative to the plaintiff’s prima facie case, then “it will assist the 
trier of fact if it is relevant and support by competent medical research.” The level that it must 
reach is a greater-than-50-percent probability.  
 The Court held that the Morsicato standard is applied to a defense expert’s testimony 
once the testimony’s purpose is determined. A defense expert may offer testimony not rising to 
the level of medical probability if it is in rebuttal of the plaintiff’s prima facie argument for the 
causation. Regardless of whether an expert testifies for the plaintiff or the defense, if the 
testimony is introduced for the purpose of establishing causation, it must reach the degree of 
medical probability required in Morsicato. 
  Once a plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the defendant has three options to attack the 
case. The defendant may cross-examine the plaintiff’s expert, contradict the testimony with his 
own expert, or propose an independent theory of causation. If the defense expert simply 
contradicts the plaintiff’s expert, then the testimony is not subject to the Moriscato standard. The 
purpose of the standard is not to prevent a medically competent expert’s testimony from being 
used to controvert the plaintiff’s prima facie case. However, if the defense offers its own 
independent theory of causation, that testimony is subject to Moriscato.  
  Despite this lower standard, the defense expert’s testimony must still be relevant and 
supported by competent medical authority. Consequently, the Court held that if the doctor’s 
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testimony is used to controvert the plaintiff’s prima facie theory, and if the doctor’s theory of 
causation is relevant and supported by competent medical research, then the testimony is 
admissible and not subject to the Moriscato standard.  
 Along with the instructions regarding the testimony of the doctor, the Court ordered that 
the district courts allow the nurse to testify as to the proper cleaning and sterilization procedures 
for endoscopic equipment, but ordered the courts to not allow the nurse to testify as to causation.  
CONCLUSION 
A nurse may testify as an expert in his or her area of expertise, including testimony as to 
medical causation, provided that this knowledge is part of the nurse’s experience. An expert’s 
testimony need not live up to the Moriscato standard if the testimony simply controverts the 
plaintiff’s theory of causation and is not an independent theory of causation.  
 
